

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 157991

47

ORIGIN EA-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 IO-14 USIE-00 DLOS-07 DPW-01 SR-02

ORM-03 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 ARA-16 EUR-25

NEA-14 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /167 R

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O R 201724Z JUL 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 157991

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, RW

SUBJECT: RWANDA CONSIDERING RECOGNITION OF PRG AND GRUNK

REFS: A. KIGALI 402 (NOTAL); B. KIGALI 416

1. REPORT REFTEL B MUCH APPRECIATED. WE COMMEND EMBASSY FOR FORCEFUL PRESENTATION OF REASONS WHY GOR RECOGNITION OF PRG AND GRUNK WOULD NOT BE IN ITS BEST INTERESTS.

2. WITH REFERENCE TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARA 6 REFTEL B:

(A) EMBASSY IS CORRECT THAT NO NON-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA STATE HAS RECOGNIZED PRG OR GRUNK.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 157991

(B) (1) PRG MILITARY AND POLITICAL FORTUNES HAVE NOT PROSPERED SINCE JANUARY 27, 1973 CEASE-FIRE. DESPITE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY, TERRORIST AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS-- CONDUCTED IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF CEASE-FIRE PROVISIONS-- PRG HAS BEEN UNABLE TO EXPAND EITHER ITS TERRITORIAL BASE, WHICH, WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, IS LIMITED TO SPARSELY INHABITED MOUNTAINOUS BORDER AREAS AND REMOTE, ECONOMICALLY MARGINAL ENCLAVES, OR ITS POPULATION CONTROL WHICH CONSISTS AT MAXIMUM OF ONLY 5-6 PERCENT OF 20 MILLION INHABITANTS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. WITH REFERENCE TO THIS LATTER POINT IT IS WELL TO NOTE THAT REFUGEES RESULTING FROM POST CEASE-FIRE FIGHTING HAVE CONTINUED TO "VOTE WITH THEIR FEET, BY SEEKING ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FROM GVN RATHER THAN GOING OVER TO PRG SIDE.

PRG MILITARY STRENGTH (75,000) IS ALMOST ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY UNITS IN SOUTH, NOW NUMBERING 210,000, WITHOUT WHOSE MATERIEL AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT PRG COULD NOT HOPE TO SURVIVE. ONE PRIME INDICATION OF THIS FACT WAS COMMUNIST 1972 SPRING OFFENSIVE DURING WHICH NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ASSUMED NEARLY ENTIRE BURDEN OF FIGHTING AS WEAKENED PRG WAS RELEGATED TO SUPPLEMENTARY ROLE.

IN ADDITION TO SERVING AS MILITARY BASE FOR PRG, NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE ALSO SUPPLYING INCREASINGLY LARGE NUMBER OF POLITICAL CADRE FOR PRG INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH HAS NEVER RECOVERED FROM LOSSES SUFFERED DURING 1968 TEL OFFENSIVE AND GVN-US PACIFICATION DRIVE 1968-1973. NORTHERN SUPPORT FOR PRG AND ITS PREDECESSOR NLF IS NOTHING NEW, OF COURSE, BUT CURRENT LEVEL OF PRG DEPENDENCE ON HANOI IS UNPRECEDENTED EVEN ALLOWING FOR FACT PRG IS ONLY EXTENSION OF COMMUNIST (LAO DONG) PARTY OF NORTH VIET-NAM.

(2) WITH REGARD TO GRUNK COMMUNIST INSURGENTS CURRENTLY FIND THEMSELVES IN MOST UNFAVORABLE POSITION SINCE THEY WENT ON OFFENSIVE AGAINST GKR IN 1970. GKR CONTINUES TO CONTROL GREAT BULK OF POPULATION. IT HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN HOLD PHNOM PENH AND MOST OF ITS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 157991

15 PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND RECENTLY RECAPTURED OLD ROYAL CAPITAL OF OUDONG. GKR'S RECENT JULY 9 OFFER FOR UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS HAS PUT INSURGENTS ON MORAL AND DIPLOMATIC DEFENSIVE. WE HOPE UNBALANCED REJECTION OF GKR OFFER BY SIHANOUK WILL NOT BE FINAL WORD BUT IN OUR OPINION IT REVEALS WEAKNESS OF GRUNK'S PRESENT POSITION RATHER THAN STRENGTH IN VIEW OF GKR'S PRESENT SUPERIORITY.

(C) WHILE WE WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE GOR  
RECOGNITION OF DRV, A DECISION TO LIMIT RECOGNITION TO  
HANOI WOULD BE LESS UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

(D) FOR AN EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF PRG BOGUS CLAIMS TO  
LEGITIMACY WE REFER EMBASSY TO STATE'S AIRGRAM A-4318  
DATED MAY 17, 1973 AN EXTRA COPY OF WHICH IS BEING  
POUCHED TO YOU. WE ARE ALSO SENDING SEPTTEL GKR  
UNCONDITIONAL OFFER OF NEGOTIATION IN FRENCH AS WELL AS  
MILITARY ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN PHNOM PENH 9527 WHICH

YOU MAY PASS TO GOR. USG WARMLY SUPPORTS THIS OFFER  
AS DO COUNTRIES OF REGION MOST CONCERNED. WE BELIEVE  
IT IS A STATESMANLIKE EFFORT TO SECURE A HALT TO  
FIGHTING AND MOVE TOWARDS ORDERLY RESOLUTION OF CAMBODIAN  
CONFLICT. WE WOULD NOTE FURTHER THAT NO DOUBT GOR ALREADY  
APPRECIATES DANGER TO SMALLER, WEAKER NATIONS OF THE  
WORLD WHICH IS INHERENT IN UN RECOGNITION OF INSURGENT  
REGIMES, AN ACTION WHICH IN EFFECT REDEFINES LEGITIMACY.  
COUNTRIES SUCH AS RWANDA CAN ONLY LOSE BY SUCH A  
PRECEDENT.

3. FOLLOWING NOTIFICATION OF EMBASSY'S PRESENTATION  
NOTE KIGALI DEPARTMENT PLANS TO CALL IN GOR AMBASSADOR  
TO EXPRESS OUR VIEWS. INGERSOLL

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